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Goodman, D. S. G. The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives. London:
Routledge, 2008. Ebook.
Throughout their investigation of the political, socio-economic, and cultural
characteristics of the new rich in China, the authors in this collection illustrate a unique group,
one rising from the convergence of globalization and neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics.
Published in 2008, this volume captures the prosperity of this new wealthy class before the
advent of the global financial crisis and subsequent state stimulus plans, as well as before the
anti-corruption campaigns that have plagued Xi’s presidency since 2012, all of which have
presumably altered the landscape for the wealthy in myriad ways.
It is useful to revisit the political, economic, and social conditions that gave rise to
China’s new rich, especially when we try to understand the relationships between a rising
Chinese wealthy class and luxury consumption, the global real estate market, Chinese investment
in Africa, and even the growth of maternity and birth tourism in North America.1 The wide scope
and geographical span of the studies included in this volume allow perspectives beyond the much
studied examples of Beijing and Shanghai, bringing us to China’s deindustrialized northeast, to
the country’s southernmost reaches, and to the inland.
The concept of China’s new rich is a loose one, comprising a multi-faceted group of
those who have benefited most from three decades of economic growth. Rather than a social
stratum defined by personal wealth, membership in this group, to varied degrees, rests on
ideology, status and access to power, economic resources, and social networks both local and
national. Unlike China’s power elites, members of this unique group need to navigate their way
through China’s one-party rule, forming a dynamic relationship with the party state.
Authors in the first section of this volume focus on the notion of class and examine the
contested notion of China’s new rich as something of a middle class. Compiling interview data
gathered over ten years, David Goodman provides a comprehensive view of the complex
composition of China’s middle class, comprising professionals and private entrepreneurs
alongside managers of state-, foreign-, and collectively-owned enterprises. Goodman’s
significant insight in this chapter is that this new, rich stratum of Chinese society will turn into
the new ruling class, as has already been observed in the political and socioeconomic power
wielded on a national and global stage by princelings and the new wealthy class’s second
generation (fu erdai).
In what is largely a content analysis, Yingjie Guo reviews various governmental and
academic sources to examine an ideological shift initiated by the state, which views the middle
class as the embodiment of desirable values, the backbone of the socialist market economy, and
its members as progressive actors in the “harmonious society”2 espoused by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). Most tellingly, the officially endorsed middle class is situated between
the new super rich and the increasingly disadvantaged working class.
Despite the state’s endorsement of a middle class, the general public holds a so-called
“wealth hatred” toward the new rich, as Xiaowei Zang reveals. Shady methods of capital
accumulation, immense personal wealth, and a demonstrated lack of compassion or social
responsibility are among the reasons Zang identifies as most important in understanding the
public’s negative opinions of the new rich. Furthermore, investigating three particular groups of
entrepreneurs, the so-called “official racketeering” profiteers, real estate developers, and former
managers of state and collective enterprises, Zang illustrates how the public perceives the wealth
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of this new stratum as having been accumulated as a result of exploiting state assets, directly
inflicting loss and hardship on peasants and urban working class communities.
In the last chapter of the first section, Stephanie Donald and Zheng Yi provide an
extensive literature review on the cultivation of middle class taste and attempt to link school
choices for children among Beijing’s new wealthy with Bourdieusian distinction-making.
Following the explanation in the work’s first section of the public’s negative opinions
about China’s new rich, the second section of the volume focuses on the new rich’s own
reflections upon status-seeking and esteem-fabricating processes.
Colin Hawes examines how the CEOs and other senior executives of China’s large
corporations present themselves as cultural connoisseurs and practitioners, providing educational
programs within workplaces, and facilitating cultural activities organized by the party to
contribute to the promotion of “spiritual civilization”3 (jingshen wenming) among their
employees. The author argues that all these are efforts by members of the new rich themselves to
mitigate political pressure, to deflect negative attention, and to a certain extent, portray wealthy
entrepreneurs and executives as virtuous, honorable “scholar merchants” (ru shang), and thus, an
inseparable part of a “harmonious society” under one-party rule.
Carrillo turns our gaze inland, to examine how the rich coal entrepreneurs of Shanxi
province seek social prestige through investment in education and the healthcare industry.
Paradoxically, while effectively replacing their negative reputations with respectability, private
entrepreneurs reap great profits in those seemingly philanthropic engagements, due to the
commercialization of these sectors in the economic reform era. Minglu Chen analyzes rich
empirical data to investigate female entrepreneurs’ political and social conditions in Shanxi,
Hainan, and Sichuan Provinces. Despite a significant increase in personal wealth, political
participation, and social recognition, these women remain confined by traditional gendered
expectations and continue to bear the burden of household responsibilities. This chapter is a
much needed study on China’s middle-aged female new rich beyond their consumption patterns.
Ivan Cucco illustrates how highly educated professionals and high-tech specialists in
Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu province in the Yangtze River Delta, move freely between the
private and the public sectors. Such mobility generates unprecedented advantages and results in
personal networks that benefit these professionals both economically and politically in the long
term.
Comparing professionals’ financial conditions in both the pre-reform and reform eras,
Jingqing Yang’s chapter wraps up the second section of this volume. Yang examines the
earnings of college professors, medical doctors, and lawyers, detailing how institutional changes
plausibly create grey areas in which such individuals acquire “extra” income, not always in legal
ways, and often with inconsistent results. Beyond ample survey data, we also hope to see the
sociopolitical implication or symbolic significance of these three groups joining the ill-famed
new rich, given these three groups’ high educational achievement and their professions’ prestige.
In the volume’s third section, the chapter “The Forest City Homeownership and New
Wealth in Shenyang,” Luigi Tomba and Beibei Tang illustrate the transition of Shenyang, an
industrial base in northeastern China, from dilapidation, disinvestment, and disappearance of
social services for the socialist working class, to beautification, gentrification, and the rise of the
propertied urban elites. During Shenyang’s rebranding into a post-industrial metropolis,
inequality has been widespread in the form of housing quality and location, as the state actively
caters to the needs of the young professionals and entrepreneurs, neglecting the working class.
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Carolyn Cartier looks at how the new rich and aspiring middle class try to claim their
social status through luxury consumption, in particular, through shopping trips to Hong Kong
and the purchasing of fine jewelry. Focusing on professional and young female consumers’
interest in diamonds, Cartier also hints at empowerment through consumption among China’s
middle class. What Cartier has discovered about their repeated shopping trips to Hong Kong
helps us to understand the current proliferation of such trips to the U.S. and European countries.
Through a case study of activism on women’s issues such as sexual violence and female
infanticide, Louise Edwards argues that politically engaged young middle-class women practice
issue-based politics in an effort to construct a civil society within the authoritarian party-state.
However, while such activists’ claims address the evils of the patriarchal structure, these
privileged female urbanites have no intention of challenging the current regime. Thus, in
response to such activism, the CCP has simply strengthened its authority and the legitimacy of
one-party-rule. In light of the recent imprisonment of feminist activists, the optimistic view
expressed in Edwards’ study reminds us of the contingency of the CCP policy and urges an
updated study on the deteriorated situation for women’s activism in the era of the “China
Dream.”4
Centered on the role of domestic service in the homes of the new rich, Wanning Sun
illustrates the creation of a distinct middle-class in the domestic sphere, for which having a maid
is essential. Based on rich qualitative data, Sun argues that regardless of whether urban middleclass women choose to be full-time wives, full-time professionals, or anywhere in between, their
“freedom” comes at the expense of predominantly rural poor women, who provide invisible
though indispensable labor in urban homes. From the voices of domestic workers in this study,
we learn about how class identities and gender roles are reconstructed and refabricated in the
post-socialist era. In the last chapter of this volume, Elaine Jeffreys provides a content analysis
of scholarly studies and media accounts of China’s bureaucrat-entrepreneurs’ moral and sexual
corruption. She ponders whether this counter-stabilizing matter would be resolved through “rule
of law.”
The “China Dream” currently advocated under Xi Jinping’s presidency calls for not only
full-fledged individualism and self-governmentality but also loyalty to the party. Since the
publication of this text (and, indeed, since the rhetoric of the “harmonious society” espoused in
the 2000s, during which the studies in this volume were conducted), we have seen increased
social tensions surrounding income and gender inequality. Chapters in this volume serve as
important reminders of how the Chinese middle class was constructed to be ideologically
compatible with the socialist market economy and, specifically, to justify various social
inequalities. This book will be useful for scholars and students interested in contemporary China,
social stratification, women studies, and transitions of socialist regimes.
Fang Xu PhD
University of California, Berkeley
fangxu@berkeley.edu
1

Birth tourism is something of an underground industry in which wealthy expectant Chinese mothers
travel to the United States to bear their children, subsequently departing with a US passport and birth
certificate for their newborn babies.
2
With the concept of social harmony in China dating back to ancient times, the notion of a “harmonious
society” was developed as a key socioeconomic component of President Hu Jintao’s (2003-2013)
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administration in response to calls for increased attention to social justice in China. The governing
philosophy implied by the term included a shift in focus from economic growth toward overall societal
“balance and harmony.”
3
Deng Xiaoping first introduced the concept in 1980, and it remains an important notion in CCP’s
political vocabulary throughout the later presidencies of Jiang Zemin (1989-2002), Hu Jintao (2003-2013),
and Xi Jinping (2013- ) It is developed in tandem with the notion "material civilization"(wuzhi wenming),
the heightened level of the latter is demonstrated by the improved material conditions in the economic
reform era. "Spiritual-civilization"-building policies stress the importance of socialist morality, political
consciousness, and discipline, in an effort to ward off negative aspects of the societal transformation, such
as nihilism, consumerism, and hedonism.
4 The term “China Dream,” was a concept introduced by Xi Jinping, the current General Secretary and
President of CCP, in November 2012. In his speech, he used the phrase to mean “the rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation”, but the exact implication of this political ideal remained vague, without clear parameters.
Within Chinese socialist thought, in general, it describes a set of nationalist ideals and is meant to invoke
the notion of Chinese prosperity, emphasizing the importance of collective effort and socialism in order to
achieve national glory. Xi has asserted that citizens should “dare to dream” and be “inspired to realize the
dream” as a means of contributing to the revitalization of the country.

